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A B S T R A C T   
In actual energy-only markets, the high volatility of power prices affects the expected returns of generators. 
When dealing with irreversibility under uncertainty, deferring decisions to commit in new power plants, waiting 
for better information, is therefore a rational approach. Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that such 
investment pattern determines the occurrence of construction cycles, which strongly compromise supply secu-
rity. In order to supplement generators’ revenues, several remuneration mechanisms have been devised over past 
years. Along this line, this work addresses the long-run dynamics of capacity adequacy and market efficiency 
with both a price-based and a quantity-based capacity remuneration policy. For that purpose, a recently- 
developed, stochastic simulation model is used as a benchmark. Hence, the optimal postponement of genera-
tion investment decisions is integrated into a long-run power market model by formulating the decision-making 
problem in the framework of Real Options Analysis. Results suggest that policymakers may exchange supply 
security (effectiveness) for energy prices to be paid by consumers (efficiency) when designing and implementing 
capacity remuneration mechanisms. By doing so, this article contributes to the ongoing debate regarding the 
design of incentive policies and efficient power markets by considering the microeconomics of investors’ 
decision-making under irreversibility and uncertainty.   
1. Introduction 
Over the last 30 years, electricity markets worldwide have faced the 
process of liberalization. This term refers to the unbundling of the 
former vertical industry, and the introduction of competition (mainly) in 
the generation segment. Now, the generation expansion involves mul-
tiple self-oriented firms making individual investment decisions and 
seeking to maximize their own financial profits. In order to decide in-
vestments, generation companies follow price signals associated to a 
remuneration obtained from the Optimal Spot Price Theory (Caramanis 
et al., 1982). Under perfect competition, the market rewards each firm at 
a price set by the marginal cost of the most expensive generation unit in 
service, according to an economic dispatch. Under short-term demand 
irresponsiveness, when supply and demand cannot be cleared, the 
market price escalates to a rather high value (in contrast to production 
costs), which denotes the marginal cost of load shedding, i.e. the Value of 
Lost Load (VOLL). This arrangement corresponds the traditional struc-
ture of liberalized power markets, and is known as the energy-only market 
(Stoft, 2002). 
Energy-only markets theoretically offer sufficient incentives to 
guarantee the financial return of investors in the long run and thereby to 
ensure supply security (Caramanis, 1982). Such market architecture 
would allow efficient investments to expand the generating capacity, in 
response to demand growth, with an appropriate level of reliability. 
Nonetheless, actual markets tend to exhibit imperfections, such as in-
formation asymmetries, herding behavior, and bounded rational ex-
pectations. In the context of high uncertainty, investors are prone to be 
risk-averse when deciding to invest in new power plants, thus affecting 
the ideal process of keeping system adequacy. This is due to the inter-
action between the volatility of revenue coming from the energy-only 
market and the formation of profitability expectations by investors. In 
the long term, this leads to the appearance of so-called construction cycles 
of generating capacity. This situation describes the long-term evolution 
of power systems in terms of subsequent periods of under- and 
over-investment in power plants. The literature provides empirical ev-
idence on the existence of construction cycles in the electricity industry 
since the late 1980s (Arango and Larsen, 2011). 
The volatile system behavior severely affects the security of power 
supply. Risk of deficient supply reliability is perceived as an 
* Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: dfestner@pol.una.py (D. Rios-Festner), gblanco@pol.una.py (G. Blanco), olsina@iee.unsj.edu.ar (F. Olsina).  
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
Energy Policy 
journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111185 
Received 4 May 2019; Received in revised form 6 October 2019; Accepted 10 December 2019   
Energy Policy 137 (2020) 111185
2
Abbreviations 
CC Combined-cycle generation technology 
CLD Causal-loop Diagram 
CM Capacity Market 
CP Capacity Payment 
CT Construction Time 
CV Continuation Value 
CVaR Conditional Value at Risk 
DDE Delay Differential Equation 
DPE Dynamic Programming based on the Expected present 
value 
EO Energy-only market 
EV Exercise Value 
GT Gas-turbine generation technology 
GW Gigawatt 
HC Hard-coal generation technology 
HUS Hourly Unitary Surplus 
IRR Internal Rate of Return 
LDC Load Duration Curve 
LOLP Lost of Load Probability 
MW Megawatt 
MWh Megawatt-hour 
NPV Net Present Value 
PDC Price Duration Curve 
PI Profitability Index 
ROA Real Options Analysis 
RSME Root Square Mean Error 
VaR Value at Risk 
SD System Dynamics 
VOLL Value of Lost Load 
List of Symbols: Roman symbols 
a Bidding factor for new capacity in the capacity market 
[MW] 
APi Annual unitary profits expected by technology i from the 
energy-only market [€/MW⋅year] 
d Annual duration probability to exceed a given load level L 
[adim] 
Ddef Annual probability of deficit duration system-wide [adim] 
Di Annual probability for one MW of new capacity from 
technology i to operate with market price over own 
marginal costs [adim] 
Dij Annual probability for the capacity of vintage j from 
technology i to operate with market price over own 
marginal cost [adim] 
dti Time increment between t and M for technology i [month] 
€ Symbol of currency (Euro) 
giFP Growth rate for the fuel price of capacity from technology i 
[%/year] 
grK Stochastic realization r of growth rate for the total system 
capacity [%/year] 
gL Long-term growth rate for maximum and minimum 
demand [%/year] 
gm Growth rate for minimum demand [%/year] 
gM Growth rate for maximum demand [%/year] 
grm Stochastic realization r of growth rate for minimum 
demand [%/year] 
grM Stochastic realization r of growth rate for maximum 
demand [%/year] 
i Subscript to individualize generating technologies [adim] 
ICi Investment cost for technology i [€/MW] 
j Subscript to individualize vintages from each generating 
technology [adim] 
Knewbid Bid of new capacity in the capacity market [MW] 
Kcumij Aggregated system capacity up to vintage j from 
technology i, according to the dispatch merit order [MW] 
_Ki Change in capacity from technology i [MW/year] 
_Kinij Rate at which capacity enters vintage j from technology i 
[MW/year] 
_Koutij Rate at which capacity abandons vintage j from technology 
i [MW/year] 
K*I Desired total installed capacity [MW] 
KT Total installed capacity [MW] 
KrT Stochastic realization r of expected total installed capacity 
[MW] 
imi Investment multiplier for technology i [adim] 
immaxi Maximum investment multiplier for technology i [adim] 
ICi Investment cost for technology i [€/MW] 
_Ii Investment rate for technology i [MW/year] 
_Irefi Reference investment rate for technology i [MW/year] 
L Load level exceeding an annual duration d [MW] 
Lr Stochastic realization r of load level exceeding an annual 
duration d [MW] 
_Li Expected change in portion of peak load covered by 
technology i [MW/year] 
Lmin Minimum demand [MW] 
Lmax Maximum demand [MW] 
Mi Option Maturity for technology i [year] 
MCi Marginal cost of capacity from technology i [€/MWh] 
E½MP� Expected market price [€/MWh] 
Pavg Average unit size system-wide [MW] 
PC Average system production cost [€/MWh] 
PIi Profitability index for technology i [adim] 
q Expected availability of generating units [adim] 
r Superscript to denoted realizations of stochastic variables 
[adim] 
RM System reserve margin [adim] 
RM* Desired system reserve margin [adim] 
S Number of simulation time steps [adim] 
t Dynamic time [year] 
T Simulation horizon [year] 
Ti Lifetime for technology i [year] 
TAi Amortization period for technology i [year] 
TCi Construction lead-time for technology i [month] 
TPTAi Expected stream of total operating profits for technology i 
over TAi [€/MW] 
V*i Optimal investment policy for technology i [€/MW] 
Vconti Continuation value for technology i [€/MW] 
Vexi Exercise value for technology i [€/MW] 
Greek symbols 
αi Factor to control the slope of the multiplier curve for 
technology i [adim] 
βi Factor to define the x-axis position of the multiplier curve 
for technology i [adim] 
πCM Capacity market clearing price [€/MW⋅year] 
πEM Annual unitary revenues coming from the energy-only 
market [€/MW⋅year] 
πi Annual unitary rents expected by technology i from the 
energy-only market [€/MW⋅year] 
πbid;newi Bid price of new capacity from technology i in the capacity 
market [€/MW∙year] 
πbid;oldij Bid price of existing capacity from vintage j of technology i 
in the capacity market [€/MW∙year] 
πCMi Annual unitary rents expected by technology i from the 
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unacceptable outcome since electricity is a critical input to modern 
economies. Therefore, several systems have envisioned the integration 
of capacity remuneration mechanisms in order to acknowledge the role 
of generators in guaranteeing supply security. The design and imple-
mentation of these mechanisms is attributed to the system administrator 
(government or regulator), and depend mostly on the power market 
itself. The literature recognizes a consensus in classifying capacity 
remuneration mechanisms according to two types, so-called price-based 
and quantity-based (Bublitz et al., 2019). Under price-based mechanisms, 
the administrator sets an additional revenue for generators in return for 
assuring supply security. The product indicating the security of supply is 
often referred to the firm capacity of generators. Because of that, this 
mechanism is usually known as capacity payment. Quantity-based 
mechanisms involve a quite different approach. Here, the demand is 
obliged to purchase (directly, or through the regulator) an explicit 
quantity of the product expressing supply security. In that sense, such 
product might adopt several forms, including the system’s firm capacity, 
capacity credits, capacity certificates, and forward contracts, among 
others (Battle and Rodilla, 2010). 
In recent years, capacity mechanisms have been introduced in many 
developed markets, e.g. Australia, the European Union, Scandinavia, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, and emerging economies (e.g. 
some Latin American countries). Nonetheless, the cumulated experience 
is yet insufficient to agree on the contribution and effectiveness of the 
several capacity mechanisms implemented to the long-term security of 
supply (Schreiber, 2018). For instance, certain markets, e.g. Ireland, 
Italy and Poland, are currently planning to adapt their prevailing ca-
pacity mechanism. Moreover, Spain applied a new mechanism in 2016, 
after abolishing the investment incentive in place since 2007. The 
Spanish case is exemplary since the success of the former capacity 
mechanism was severely affected by an economic crisis and a demand 
growth lower than expected (Bublitz et al., 2019). 
In general, foreseeing the long-term dynamics of liberalized power 
markets is extremely difficult. Thus, generators, governments and reg-
ulators need to rely on mathematical models to gain insight on the long- 
run market behavior. In this vein, simulation models are able to reproduce 
the rationale, incentives and limitations behind the decision-making of 
competing generators, including aspects such as bounded rationality, 
learning abilities, imperfect foresight, etc. (Ventosa et al., 2005). A 
suitable approach to formulate simulation models of complex systems, e. 
g. competitive generation systems, is System Dynamics (SD) (Sterman, 
2000). First, SD concentrates on outlining the logical interrelationships 
among several components, thus characterizing the system under study 
through a macroscopic description of the feedback structure. Then, the 
evolving state of the system is expressed in terms of a set of non-linear 
delay differential equations. Finally, the system behavior in the long 
term raises from the numerical resolution of such set of equations. 
The literature includes a broad body of articles that employ SD to 
assess the expansion of competitive generation systems in the long run 
(Leopold, 2015; Ahmad et al., 2016; Rios et al., 2016). By following the 
traditional approach, the majority of works has studied the energy-only 
market (Bunn and Larsen, 1992; Bunn and Larsen, 1994; Kadoya et al., 
2005; Eager et al., 2010; Pereira and Saraiva, 2011; Osorio and van 
Ackere, 2016; Movahednasab et al., 2017). In agreement with the 
observed global trend, several articles have as well assessed the elec-
tricity market development with the adoption capacity mechanisms. 
Most of these works have analyzed the implementation of price-based 
mechanisms, e.g. capacity payments (Ford, 1999; Assili et al., 2008; 
Hasani-Marzooni and Hosseini, 2013; Pereira and Saraiva, 2013; Iba-
nez-Lopez et al., 2017). In recent years, research focus has been mainly 
on evaluating quantity-based mechanisms, comprising a capacity mar-
ket and a strategic reserve mechanism (Hary et al., 2016); a forward 
market (�Alvarez-Uribe et al., 2018); and a capacity certificate (Heidar-
izadeh and Ahmadian, 2019). Both price-based and quantity-based 
mechanisms have been assesed by de Vries and Heijnen (2008) and 
Hasani-Marzooni and Hosseini (2011a). Furthermore, some of these 
articles explicitly introduce metrics for assessing the market develop-
ment more rigorously (Assili et al., 2008; de Vries and Heijnen, 2008; 
Hary et al., 2016). These metrics often contrasts the effectiveness against 
the efficiency of the capacity incentive. On one hand, effectiveness can 
refer to the degree of supply security, while, on the other hand, effi-
ciency can be related to energy costs for consumers. 
Beyond the remuneration design, all of these articles have described 
the addition of new power plant projects by assuming risk-neutral in-
vestors, e.g. by computing the classical expected Net Present Value (NPV) 
of new investments. Fewer works have characterized the risk-aversion 
associated to generators’ decision-making, as evidenced by the experi-
enced of actual power markets. These efforts mainly deal with an 
energy-only market design, and include the application of a risk- 
adjusted Internal Rate of Return (IRR) (Olsina et al., 2006; Olsina and 
Garc�es, 2008; S�anchez et al., 2008); and the Value at Risk (VaR) 
approach (Eager et al., 2012). Even so, recent articles have employed SD 
to analyze the impact of capacity mechanisms (e.g. a capacity market 
and a strategic reserve mechanism) on the mitigation of construction 
cycles, by assuming risk-averse investors. On one hand (Petitet et al., 
2017), introduces a utility function where the coefficient of 
risk-aversion controls the responsiveness of investors to the expected 
NPV of new power plant projects. On the other hand (Abani et al., 2018), 
adjusts the expected profitability of new investments by applying the 
Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) approach. 
1.1. Contribution 
In liberalized power markets, the risk-aversion of investors origi-
nates mainly due to characteristics of power plant projects, e.g. capital- 
intensive, one-step outlays, long payback times, and irreversibility (Dixit 
and Pindyck, 1994). Furthermore, decisions have to be made within a 
dynamic market setting, marked by the interaction of multiple, 
self-oriented generators and the development of uncertain variables. 
Keeping that in mind, risk-aversion suggests that investors would delay 
construction of new generating units until the expected profits were 
certain and large enough. This possibility derives from considering a 
major attribute of power plant investments, known as the postponement 
(or deferral) option. Formally, this concept refers to the preference of 
investors to withhold the addition on new generating units when facing 
major uncertainties upon the electricity market development (Blanco 
capacity market [€/MW⋅year] 
πCPi Annual unitary rents expected by technology i from 
capacity payments [€/MW⋅year] 
ρ Required revenue rate for each technology [%/year] 
ϕi Risk-free discount rate for technology i [%/year] 
Symbols of the mean-reverting stochastic process 
dg Expected change in a growth rate 
dt Time increment 
g Growth rate 
g Long-term (mean) growth rate 
η Speed of reversion towards the mean growth rate 
σ Volatility of the growth rate 
dz Variable following a Wiener Process 
ε Normally distributed random variable 
N Number of correlated, stochastic variables 
B Matrix of N correlation coefficients 
εN Set of N uniformly distributed random variables 
θN Set of N correlated random variables  
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and Olsina, 2011). The availability of the deferral option embedded in 
most generation project provides with an alternative description to the 
occurrence of construction cycles, in terms of the decision-making of 
irreversible investments under uncertainty. The observed behavior of 
postponing decisions to commit into irreversible investments under 
uncertainty was first acknowledged in a SD long-term electricity market 
model by delaying the investment signal in a fixed amount (Olsina, 
2005; Olsina et al., 2006). Nonetheless, this overly simplistic approach is 
unable to capture the microeconomics behind the dynamic interactions 
among strategic flexibility, investment irreversibility and uncertainty. 
In order to cope with this aspect suitably, modern investment valu-
ation tools should be applied. One of such approaches involves Real 
Options Analysis (ROA), which offers a well-founded framework that 
allows seizing the availability of options,1 thus making strategic in-
vestment decisions (Brosch, 2001). The idea behind ROA is to assign 
with a value to all options inherent to an investment project, in addition 
to calculating its NPV. By definition, the option value is always positive. 
Because of that, its computation increases the regular project value and 
provides with strategic flexibility to the decision-making. The value of 
complex real options is obtained by option pricing methods based on 
stochastic simulation combined with approximate dynamic programing 
(Longstaff and Schwartz, 2001; Blanco and Olsina, 2011). This 
simulation-based option valuation approach is commonly referred as 
Least-square Monte Carlo (LSM). Ultimately, by applying ROA, market 
uncertainties affecting project returns are offset thanks to the definition 
of a lower limit to potential losses,2 while the opportunity for capturing 
large profits remains open. 
A recent work addresses the long-run dynamics of generation ca-
pacity adequacy in energy-only markets under consideration of the 
flexibility value of deferring decision to build new power plants (Rios 
et al., 2019). For that purpose, the market dynamics are modeled with 
SD, while the option value of new projects is computed by means of ROA 
and stochastic dynamic programming. This work seeks to take advan-
tage of the proposed modeling approach in order to assess the long-term 
evolution of power markets when investors consider different capacity 
incentives under irreversibility and uncertainty. By adopting System 
Dynamics modeling approach, the decision-making of a number of in-
vestors can be described in an aggregated fashion. Here, such aggregated 
behavior is classified according to three generating technologies. This 
mathematical methodology is adopted because it allows to easily model 
informational and physical feedbacks, nonlinearities and stock and 
flows structures of dynamical systems, e.g. competitive power markets.3 
The capacity mechanisms discussed in this article imply both, a 
price-based capacity payment and a quantity-based capacity market. 
The first mechanism is inspired by the dynamic remuneration intro-
duced in England and Wales between 1990 and 2001. Under such 
scheme, investors received a price uplift given by the probability of 
capacity shortfall, i.e. the Loss of Load Probability (LOLP), times the 
energy scarcity price, given by the VOLL. The second incentive is com-
parable to the capacity mechanism prevailing in France and Great 
Britain (RTE, 2014; DECC, 2014). It involves the definition of a capacity 
obligation in advance, which equals a peak load forecast plus a target 
reserve margin. Generators offer existing and new capacity seeking to 
reach that obligation. Hence, the capacity market clearing price sets the 
additional remuneration of investors. 
In both cases, the capacity mechanism will increase the revenue 
obtained in the energy-only market. New power capacity additions will 
then be decided based on the application of ROA, by deeming the pos-
sibility to defer the investment decision while key uncertainties are 
resolved. By doing so, this article offers an innovative assessment of 
power capacity incentives by modeling the long-run investment dy-
namics under irreversibility and uncertainty. It is assumed that a lower 
revenue volatility, thanks to the introduction of capacity mechanisms, 
would allow timely capacity additions, thereby enabling a steadier 
evolution of the reserve margin in the long term. Thus, this work con-
tributes in shedding light on the ongoing discussion about the perfor-
mance of such remuneration mechanisms based on long-term market 
dynamics. 
We organize the reminder of this article as follows: Section 2 de-
scribes the proposed market model; Section 3 discusses obtained results; 
and finally Section 4 provides the concluding remarks with emphasis on 
the policy implications. 
2. Modeling power market dynamics with capacity mechanisms 
2.1. Model overview 
The feedback structure driving the long-run power market evolution 
with the remuneration alternatives discussed in this work is depicted in 
the Causal-loop Diagram (CLD4) of Fig. 1. This diagram is constructed 
upon previous contributions included in Olsina et al. (2006) and Rios 
et al. (2019), which describe the dynamic development of electricity 
markets from the point of view of investor’s decision-making. The in-
formation flow throughout the CLD is described as follows. Investors 
perceive an instant energy price signal, according to the capacity reserve 
and fuel costs (loop B1). Simultaneously, they form expectations upon 
future energy prices based on uncertainties driving the development of 
the same parameters (loop B2). The capacity reserve also influences the 
Fig. 1. CLD describing the dynamics of generation capacity additions in a 
power market with capacity incentives. 
1 Alongside the postponement, these options might also include expansion, 
abandonment, switch-business, switch-input, closing and reopening (Copeland 
and Antikarov, 2003).  
2 These losses refer mainly to the price paid to obtain the right to exercise the 
option.  
3 It is important to point out that, under perfect competition, valuation of 
postponement option does not depend on investment decisions made by 
competing firms. Indeed, the deferral option can correctly be valued by 
myopically assuming the firm is in isolation (as it was a monopolist) and 
exposed only to competitive fuel and power prices. This important result has 
been demonstrated in Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Chapter 8. 
4 A CLD is an analysis tool from SD modeling that allows depicting the overall 
feedback structure of complex systems. A CLD includes variables linked by 
arrows representing causal influence. Each causal link is assigned a polarity 
(either positive (þ) or negative (  )), indicating how the dependent variable 
changes when so does the independent variable. 
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existence of capacity incentives. On one hand, if the reserve margin 
decreases, more units would be operating over longer periods in order to 
meet demand, probably affecting maintenance schedules, and thus 
increasing a capacity payment based on the expected price approach. On 
the other hand, a decreasing reserve would also mean the installed ca-
pacity falling behind its target, set in the context of a capacity market 
and an expected, long-term demand growth. Thus, more expensive 
generation units would clear the capacity market, which would as well 
upturn the price signal and the remuneration coming from such capacity 
market. 
The price signal of the energy-only market, plus remunerations, 
would be compared against capital costs in order to determine the 
profitability on new power plants. By assuming the risk-aversion of in-
vestors, the decision-making would also consider the irreversibility 
under uncertainty and the strategic flexibility to postpone new in-
vestments. Hence, by applying ROA concepts, new power plants would 
be decided based on the computation of two values, so-called the Exercise 
Value (EV) and the Continuation Value (CV). On one hand, the EV would 
denote an observed profitability, in terms of the typical NPV of imme-
diately undertaking new power plants. On the other hand, the CV would 
give an expected profitability, i.e. a discounted NPV, if the decision were 
to postpone investments and exercise them after some time. Such time is 
known as the Option Maturity, and specifies the future moment when a 
decision must be made about the project (exercise or not), if deferred. 
A Profitability Index (PI), given the ratio between the EV and the CV, 
would indicate the amount of new investments to be added into the 
system at each simulation step. New power plants would come to 
operation after a given Construction Time (CT). Only then, a new level of 
installed capacity would be defined by the sum of existing capacity and 
new investments, minus the decommissioning of old power plants. This 
capacity, in comparison to the observed demand, would finally set a new 
level of capacity reserve, and therefore, a new prevailing level of energy 
prices. Considering the logic behind the CLD of Fig. 1, a set of nonlinear 
differential equations should be formulated in order to reproduce the 
power market dynamics. The next subsections provide details on this 
mathematical model. 
2.2. Underlying power market model 
The impact of remuneration mechanisms on power market dynamics 
is analyzed by taking advantage of a structural power market model. 
Such model provides a solid mathematical background that allows 
describing the long-term dynamics of electricity markets. For the sake of 
brevity, this article only offers an overview about its main features. For 
further details, the reader is referred to Olsina et al. (2006) and Rios 
et al. (2019). 
2.2.1. Supply side model 
A test generation system is considered, including only three thermal 
technologies: base (coal-fired plants – HC), middle (gas-fired combined 
cycles – CC), and peak (gas turbines – GT). Based on initial conditions of 
electricity demand, fixed and variable generation costs, the optimal 
technology mix at the beginning of simulations comprises 72.31% of HC; 
14.43% of CC; and 12.26% of GT; with an initial system capacity equal 
to 16.46 GW. Such optimal mix is associated to the economically optimal 
level of supply reliability, which derives an optimal reserve margin 
equal to 9.75% for this test system.5 The optimal reliability level for this 
system implies an initial capacity shortfall probability (LOLP) of 0.0052. 
The initial mix is attained by computing the screening curves6 for the 
three technologies under study. 
The age progression of generating units is simulated endogenously 
by implementing a capacity aging chain.7 Thus, the generating capacity 
is classified for each technology in five vintages. In addition, it is sup-
posed that any unit of capacity will reside in the system over its entire 
lifetime. Based on operation premises of base, middle and peak tech-
nologies, distinct values equal to 40, 30 and 20 years denote lifetimes of 
HC, CC and GT, respectively. 
When simulations start, capacity additions are endogenously decided 
based on prevailing profitability expectations that prospectively offer 
each generating technology. At each time step t, the net change in ca-





i5 ðtÞ (1)  
where _Kini1ðtÞ is the completion rate of new units, while _K
out
i5 ðtÞ is the 
decommission rate of old units. Since lifespan of generating units are 
assumed constant, _Kouti5 ðtÞ is the completion rate at time t   Ti, that is 
_Kouti5 ðtÞ ¼ _K
in
i1ðt   TiÞ with Ti being the lifetime of technology i. 
The completion rate _Kini1ðtÞ denotes the investment rate that prevailed 
at time t   TCi , with T
C
i being the construction time for technology i. By 
considering distinct premises for the completion of units from each 
generating technology, typical values equal to 36, 18 and 9 months are 
assigned to the mean construction time of HC, CC, and GT power plants, 
respectively. The investment rate for technology i at time t   TCi , 
















At time t   TCi , the investment multiplier for technology i, imiðPIiðt  
TCi ÞÞ, is subject to the profitability index, PIiðt   T
C
i Þ, introduced by the 
CLD of Fig. 1. Hence, logistic functions are defined to reproduce the 
effect of the PI on the investment rate for each technology. Analytically, 





In Eq. (3), for each technology i, immaxi denotes the level of saturation of 
the logistic functions; αi controls the slope, and βi defines the position of 
the sigmoid with respect to the x-axis. The saturation level seeks to 
represent the cautious behavior of investors, even when facing high 
profitability conditions, as they known the danger of an investment 
overreaction to favorable short-term market context. Distinct values are 
5 The optimal level of supply reliability is determined when the marginal cost 
of serving an additional MW of peak load equals the marginal cost of installing 
and operating an additional MW of peak capacity.  
6 Screening curves depict the total unit operating costs (fixed plus variable) as 
a function of the capacity factor. On one hand, fixed costs are associated to 
investment costs, amortization times, and revenue discount rates. On the other 
hand, variable costs are associated to the marginal generation cost of each 
technology. By assuming solely thermal technologies, the marginal cost de-
pends mainly on the fuel price and the heat rate of each generation unit. The 
applied method is explained by Olsina et al. (2006) and is referred to Stoft 
(2002).  
7 Aging chains differentiate a production capacity in terms of productivity. In 
this case, such productivity is associated to the thermal efficiency of generating 
units. 
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assumed for the parameters of the logistic functions of each generation 
technology, since the risks involved are different for the several tech-
nologies (minimum economic unit size and, investments costs). None-
theless, it is worth to mention that the tipping point for each function 
will occur when the PI is one. At that point, the investment rate would 
adopt a reference value, _Irefi [MW/year], i.e. an investment rate derived 
from zero profitability expectations. This variable is computed at time t 
by: 
_Iiref ðtÞ¼ _Kouti5 ðtÞ þ _LiðtÞ (4)  
Here, _Kouti5 ðtÞ is the decommission rate of technology i, while _LiðtÞ is the 
completion rate required for such technology to match the expected 
growth of peak load while the optimal technology mix is preserved. The 
mathematical framework behind the computation of this latter variable 
can be found in Olsina et al. (2006). It is worth to mention that model 
parameters are provided in extent in Section 3. 
2.2.2. Demand side model 
Given the long-term nature of the study, power demand is repre-
sented in terms of a Load Duration Curve (LDC). A LDC results from 
sorting the chronological load analyzed over a certain time (e.g. 1 year), 
from maximum to minimum. Without losing generality, and seeking to 
maintain the model simple, it is assumed that LDC would adopt a linear 
pattern over the entire simulation time. The initial condition for the LDC 
is therefore expressed by: 
Lð0Þ¼ ðLminð0Þ   Lmaxð0ÞÞ ⋅ d þ Lmaxð0Þ (5) 
In Eq. (5), Lð0Þ is the amount of load that would exceed a cumulated 
duration d over the analyzed period (e.g. 1 year), given the maximum 
and minimum demand, Lmaxð0Þ and Lminð0Þ, respectively. By ignoring 
plausible structural variations, the LDC would keep its linear shape in 
the long run. Hence, by knowing the initial values of peak and minimum 
demand, the LDC at time t is formulated as: 
LðtÞ¼ ðLminð0Þ ⋅ egm ⋅t   Lmaxð0Þ ⋅ egM ⋅tÞ ⋅ dþLmaxð0Þ⋅egM ⋅t (6)  
where gm and gM represent growth rates for peak and minimum demand, 
respectively. Typical values assigned to these parameters are fully 
included in Section 3. In addition, it is worth to note that power demand 
is assumed inelastic in the short run with respect to sudden changes of 
the energy price. Notwithstanding, if electricity prices escalate above 
the curtailment cost, it is supposed that consumers will decline to buy 
any additional energy. Here, such cost is denoted by the VOLL, which 
adopts an illustrative value of 1000 €/MWh. 
2.2.3. Uncertainty model 
The evolution of key variables of power markets is uncertain by 
nature. For instance, despite being able to observe the long-term trend of 
LDC parameters, generators might equally anticipate random fluctua-
tions of growth rates around their deterministic value. These fluctua-
tions depend upon external factors, such as changes of weather, jointly 
with sudden variations of the economic activity. 
Modeling uncertainties is critical for the underlying power market 
model because both the observed (deterministic) and the expected 
(stochastic) values of key variables are employed to compute the EV and 
the CV at each simulation step. Rios et al. (2019) include a literature 
review on the evidence supporting the adoption of the mean-reverting 
stochastic process for describing the expected growth of commodities, 
e.g. fuel prices, and power demand. Furthermore, Olsina (2005) esti-
mates parameters of mean-reverting processes from actual data of con-
sumption growth rates corresponding to three different electricity 
systems (Argentina, Germany, and Spain). These models allow simu-
lating paths that replicate well-enough the stochastic patterns of de-
mand growth rates evidenced by the historical datasets. Therefore, this 
stochastic process is adopted to reproduce stochastic paths of uncertain 
demand growth in a plausible and realistic way. 
Formally, the simplest mean-reverting process, known as the arith-
metic Ornstein-Uhlenbeck stochastic process (Gillespie, 1996), is expressed 
by: 
dg¼ η ⋅ ðg   gÞ ⋅ dtþ σ⋅dz (7) 
In Eq. (7), the expected change in the growth rate dg, after time step 
dt, depends upon the deviation of the growth rate g from its trend value 
g, times the speed of reversion towards the trend, η. It is also contingent 
upon the product of the volatility parameter σ, and the variable repro-
ducing a Brownian Motion, dz. An infinitesimal increment of this variable 






where ε represents a stochastic realization of a random variable sampled 
over the standardized normal distribution, i.e. ε ¼ Nð0; 1Þ. 
The model incorporates a description of the correlation between 
growth rates of power demand and capacity. This seeks to characterize 
the uncertainty driving the market evolution in a more realistic way. In 
that context, the set of N correlated variables θN, is required for 
replacing the set of N uniformly-random variables εN. For this purpose, 
the Cholesky decomposition is applied to the correlation matrix B, of 
dimension equal to N. In this case, N ¼ 2, given 2 correlated variables 
(growth rates of demand and capacity). By considering the decomposed 
matrix B, and the set of random variables εN, the set of correlated var-
iables N, is derived by following the method presented by Huang (2009). 
Given Eq. (7), multiple stochastic realizations of the correlated 
growth rates can be sampled by applying Monte Carlo techniques. Then, 
a stochastic realization r, for both the expected demand and generation 











M ⋅dt (9)  
KrTðMÞ¼KTðtÞ⋅e
grK ⋅dt (10) 
In Eq. (9), LrðMÞ is a realization for the load level exceeding a 
cumulated duration d at time M, given the maximum and minimum load 
observed at time t, LmaxðtÞ and LminðtÞ, respectively, and the corre-
sponding stochastic growth rates, grm and grM. Analogously, in Eq. (10), 
KrTðMÞ is a path for the future system capacity at time M, based on a 
realization of the correlated growth rate, grK. It is worth to mention that 
KTðtÞ is the total system capacity at time t, and denotes the state variable 
resulting from the dynamic market model. 
2.2.4. Decision-making model 
At any time t, an ideal investment strategy for each technology can be 
derived by comparing the value of immediately undertaking new power 
plants, i.e. the EV, with the value of projects if they can be delayed for 
reassessment after some time, i.e. the CV. Such future time, known as the 
Option Maturity, denotes the deadline when a decision must be made (to 
exercise or not). Thus, the EV is related to current market conditions and 
the investment signal observed by investors at each simulation step. 
Conversely, the CV is linked to investors’ unclear expectations upon 
future market conditions. Such expectations are expressed by a sto-
chastic sample of investment signals at the Option Maturity. In each case, 
the investment signal depends upon the aggregated supply curve and the 
load duration curve, jointly with capacity mechanisms. Details on in-
vestment signal definition are included in the next section. 
In order to apply this concept, the underlying market model adopts a 
ROA approach, the so-called the backward Dynamic Programming based 
on Expected present value (DPE) (Blanco et al., 2012). This method is built 
upon stochastic dynamic programming and allows developing an opti-
mization process appropriate for deriving instantly both the CV and the 
EV for each generation technology. 
By implementing this technique, the decision rule for technology i at 
the Option Maturity Mi ¼ t þ dti is expressed by: 
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The set of conditions can be rearranged in order to formulate the 











Here, TPTAi ðMiÞ is the expected present value of the stream of entire 
operating profits to be made over the amortization time TAi by a new MW 
of technology i coming online at Mi. In addition, ICiðMiÞ is the necessary 
capital outlay for such investment. Now, in order to quantify the deferral 
option at t, the value given by Eq. (11) should be discounted. If a discrete 
period dti separates the Option Maturity for each technology, the CV of 







where ϕi symbolizes the risk-adjusted discount rate, and dti represents 
the time step until the Option Maturity for technology i. By following the 
same logic, the NPV of a new MW, is used to derive the EV of the deferral 
option for technology i at time t, Vexi ðtÞ [€/MW]. Mathematically, this 
value is formulated as: 
Vexi ðtÞ¼ TPTAi ðtÞ   ICiðtÞ (13)  
In Eq. (13), TPTAi ðtÞ is the present value of total operating profits for a 
new generation unit from technology i being completed at time t; while 
ICiðtÞ symbolizes the required investment costs. A profitability index, 
PIiðtÞ, for power plant projects from technology i at time t is defined as 







Based on this definition, four investment strategies can be deter-
mined from the Exercise-Continuation Value plane (Fig. 2). If the PI 
were greater than one, the EV would exceed the CV, and thus the optimal 
strategy would be to Invest Now (First Strategy). However, if the PI fell 
between zero and one, the CV would exceed the EV, and thus investors 
should probably reconsider to invest later (Second Strategy). When the 
PI is smaller than zero, it is intuitive to assume that any project appraisal 
should be much more pessimistic. Now, if the PI were located between 
minus one and zero, generators are likely to defer new projects; waiting 
for market uncertainties to be (at least partially) unfolded (Third 
Strategy). Moreover, if the PI were smaller than minus one, there would 
be almost no investment incentives (Fourth Strategy). Finally, the 
profitability index is used to attain the aggregate investment rate for 
each technology, as expressed by Eq. (3). Information about model pa-
rameters (e.g. capital costs, maturity steps, discount rates) are fully 
included in Section 3. 
2.3. Generator remuneration model 
Operating profits introduced by Eq. (11) and Eq. (13) initially refer to 
an energy-only market. However, when discussing markets with ca-
pacity mechanisms, an additional source of remuneration should be 
taken into account. The modeling of three types of remuneration (based 
on an energy-only market, a capacity payment and a capacity market, 
respectively) is presented in this subsection. 
The investment decision-making model depends upon long-term 
annuity equivalents (i.e. one-year equivalents) of generation profits. 
Because of that, the capacity revenues will denote the expected addi-
tional profit that each generator would perceive in one year thanks to 
capacity mechanisms. This also intends to facilitate the dimensional 
consistency of these revenues with the primary revenues coming from 
the energy-only-market. The addition of both sources of revenues will 
allow to obtain the total, long-run profit to be perceived by generators 
over the simulation time, which will be critical for the decision-making 
of new power plants under the two case studies of capacity mechanisms. 
2.3.1. Remuneration from an energy-only market 
Under competition, the long-term behavior of electricity prices in the 
spot market guide the decision-making on new power plants. In this 
work, the Price Duration Curve (PDC) is assumed to offer an equivalent 
of the distribution of spot prices over the long term (e.g. 1 year). As 
elaborated by Olsina et al. (2006) and Rios et al. (2019), a PDC can be 
derived from the aggregated supply curve8 and the LDC. In order to 
characterize the annual distribution of spot prices, a PDC yields (in the 
x-axis) the annual probability for a capacity unit to operate with the 
market price over its own marginal cost of generation (in the y-axis). As 
mentioned in Section 2.2.1, here the system capacity is classified by age 
in vintages. Therefore, the set of duration probabilities for each vintage, 













Lmin � q⋅Kcumij � Lmax
Lmax < q⋅Kcumij
(15) 
In Eq. (15), Lmin and Lmax characterize the LDC; while Kcumij denotes the 
amount of capacity up to vintage j from technology i, sorted by the 
dispatch merit order. In addition, q accounts for the expected availability 
of generating units. This value is attained by adopting reliability models 
inspired by Olsina et al. (2006). For simulations, this value is obtained 
according to the initial conditions of peak demand, installed capacity 
and expected deficit duration, and thereafter remains constant over the 
entire simulation period. 
Since the modeling of transmission constraints is beyond the scope of 
this work, it is assumed that the capacity in each vintage will be dis-
patched any time the spot price exceeds its marginal cost of generation. 
Therefore, the annual revenue that 1 MW of new capacity from tech-
nology i would make, πi [€/MW⋅year], equals the area under the PDC, 
limited by the yearly probability of the spot price to surpass its marginal 
cost of production, Di. With the total number of hours in 1 year being 
8760, this can be formulated as: 
Fig. 2. Optimal decision regions in the EV-CV plane.  
8 The system supply curve is referred to the aggregation of capacity units 
sorted according to increasing marginal cost of generation, i.e. the dispatch merit 
order. 
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In accordance with Eq. (16), an investor in technology i would expect 
that 1 MW of new capacity made an annual profit, APi [€/MW⋅year], 
equal to the enclosed area between the PDC and its expected marginal 




½PDC   MCi� ⋅ dD (17) 
By supposing that the annual profit obtained with Eq. (17) will 
remain constant over the amortization time TAi , the present value of the 





ðtÞ [€/MW], can be expressed as: 












Here, ρ symbolizes a required return rate at which the expected stream 
of profits must be discounted. In addition, TCi is an average construction 
time for technology i, implying that investors will account for a delay 
between the decision-making and the actual coming to operation when 
estimating the benefits of new generation units. 
It is worth to recognize that, in an energy only market, Eq. (18) will 
determine the entire operating profit to be collected by investors. Thus, 
at each time, the observed PDC will determine the EV, while stochastics 
expectations upon the PDC at the Option Maturity will determine the CV 
of new power plants for each technology. Despite its simplicity, the 
approximation given by Eq. (18) can also be explained as an efficient 
energy forward contract auction (Moreno et al., 2010). Finally, as noted 
in preceding Sections, parameters describing the proposed model are 
showed in Section 3. 
2.3.2. Remuneration from capacity payments 
This work adopts an approach to model capacity payments inspired 
by the dynamic capacity mechanism that prevailed in the former pool of 
England and Wales over the ‘90s, before entering into effect the New 
Energy Trading Agreement (NETA) in 2001 (Chuang and Wu, 2000; 
Allan and Navarro Sanchez, 2004). Based on this capacity payment 
approach, the additional revenue that 1 MW from technology i would 
expect to make over 1 year, πCPi ðtÞ [€/MW∙year], can be estimated by
10: 
πCPi ðtÞ¼E½LOLPðtÞ�⋅½VOLL ⋅ 8760   πiðtÞ� (19)  
where E½LOLPðtÞ� refers to the long-term expectation upon deficit 
probability, and πiðtÞ is the annual unitary revenue that the same 1 MW 
from technology i would make in the energy market, as defined by Eq. 
(16). 
Within an electricity market with capacity payments, an investor 
might then accrue a yearly net profit equal to the sum of Eq. (17) and Eq. 
(19). This addition should be used in Eq. (18) in order to compute the 
full stream of operating profits to be expected over the amortization time 
of each technology. Over the simulation time, both observed and ex-
pected capacity payments are critical for the decision-making model 
based on Real Options. Therefore, the capacity payment being observed 
by investors will be contingent upon the current state of the E½LOLPðtÞ�
and the πiðtÞ. Analogously, expectations upon capacity payments at the 
Option Maturity will depend upon the future states of the E½LOLPðtÞ� and 
the πiðtÞ, according to the uncertain expectations upon demand and 
capacity growth being formed at each time. 
In Eq. (19), the E½LOLPðtÞ� is associated to the expected power deficit 
duration at time t. Here, this value defines the probability of capacity 
shortfall in the long term. In order to derive this parameter as a function 
of the reserve margin, a simple probabilistic reliability model is adopted 
(Olsina et al., 2006). The model involves a simple generation model plus 
a load model, aiming at characterizing the uncertainty upon unit 
availability and load forecasting. Due to space restrictions, the model is 
not included in this paper. Nonetheless, it is worth to note that the ex-
pected deficit duration at time t, E½Ddef ðtÞ�, and so the E½LOLPðtÞ�, can be 










Here, RMðtÞ is the system reserve margin; PavgðtÞ denotes the average 
unit size in the system; and LmaxðtÞ represents the peak load expected 
available capacity. The function relating the system reserve margin with 
the expected deficit duration is shown in Fig. 3. For further details, the 
extended model and assumptions are included in Olsina et al. (2006). 
2.3.3. Remuneration from a capacity market 
In this article, a capacity market model defining a long-run clearing 
price is adopted. Hary et al. (2016) offer an example of the application of 
this method, which can be seen as a long-term capacity auction mech-
anism. A long-term equivalent to a capacity market can be built analo-
gously to an energy-only market. First, a supply curve would result from 
sorting cumulated bids of new and existing generation capacity from 
lower to higher. Bids of existing capacity can be given by the state 
variables of the generation test system, i.e. the available capacity 
residing instantly at each vintage from each technology. Likewise, the 
amount of new available capacity from technology i to be bid at any 
time, Kbid;newi ðtÞ [MW], can be proportional to its installed capacity, KiðtÞ
Fig. 3. Expected load curtailment duration as a function of the system reserve 
margin (Olsina et al., 2006). 
9 According to the economics of power generation, the marginal cost is 
associated to the variable costs of power plants. By assuming linear variable 
costs, the marginal cost of the conventional units under study is given by the 
ratio between the fuel price and its heat rate. For further details, the reader is 
referred to Stoft (2002).  
10 Under the pricing rules of the former British pool, bidding generators were 
paid in each hourly time interval t the expected energy price E½λt �. Future 
system states were assembled into two mutually exclusive sets: states without 
power deficit, with cumulative probability (1-LOLPt) and prevailing system 
marginal price SMPt, and capacity shortfall (complementary) states with 
occurrence probability LOLPt and prices set at VOLL. The expected pool price 
that gets an available generator at time t is therefore given by (Olsina et al., 
2014):E½λt � ¼ ð1   LOLPtÞSMPt þ LOLPt ⋅VOLL. By rearranging, the well-known 
pricing formulaE½λt � ¼ SMPt þ LOLPtðVOLL   SMPtÞ is obtained. The first term 
of this equation, i.e. the system marginal price, was paid only to accepted 
(dispatched) generators. The second term represented the dynamic hourly ca-
pacity payment to all bidding (available) generators. 
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[MW]. This can be formulated as: 
Kbid;newi ðtÞ¼ a ⋅ q⋅KiðtÞ (21)  
where a is the bidding factor (dimensionless) for new capacity. In this 
work, a bidding factor of 10.12% is assigned to each technology. Like-
wise, the expected availability of new power plants is denoted by q, 
which is introduced in Section 2.3.1. 
The bid price for both existing and new capacity is endogenously 
determined based on the notion of expected “missing money” from en-
ergy profits. Thus, investors need to assess their profitability expecta-
tions against avoidable costs. These expectations depend upon revenues 
that would come from both the energy-only and the capacity market. 
First, the expected revenues coming from the energy-only market can be 
associated to the long-term spot price. By rearranging Eq. (15), the ex-
pected value of revenues coming from the spot market over 1 year, πEM 





Hence, each generator would offer capacity at a price at least equal to 
the difference between the expected revenues and its avoidable costs. If 
the expected spot price is higher than its avoidable costs, a rational 
investor would then bid zero on the capacity market. Conversely, if the 
expected spot price is lower than the costs, the investor need to bid the 
difference in order to recover entirely its avoidable costs. 
For existing capacity, the avoidable costs are mainly the variable fuel 
costs. By knowing the marginal generation cost, MCijðtÞ [€/MWh], the 
bid price for 1 existing MW from vintage j of technology i at time t, 
πbid;oldij ðtÞ [€/MW∙year], can be then formulated as: 
πbid;oldij ðtÞ¼max
�
MCijðtÞ ⋅ 8760   πEMðtÞ; 0
�
(23) 
For new capacity, avoidable costs are increased by capital costs. In 
order to determine the bid price, an NPV-based method is employed. As 
referred by Hary et al. (2016), since the capacity market price will be 
guaranteed for only one year, investors then need to bid the difference 
between their investment costs and the present value of the expected 
stream of operating profits to come from the energy-only market over 
the amortization time of new power plants. For each technology, the 
expected total discounted cash flow due to energy rents is given by Eq. 
(18). By assuming the investment costs of technology i, ICiðtÞ[€/MW], 
the unitary bid price of new capacity, πbid;newi ðtÞ [€/MW∙year], can be 
thus determined by: 
πbid;newi ðtÞ¼max
h
ICiðtÞ   TPTAi ðtÞ; 0
i
(24) 
After endogenously defining quantities and prices for capacity bids, 
the system administrator (or regulator) can set a target installed ca-
pacity, K*I ðtÞ [MW], as the demand curve for the capacity market. This 
curve can be defined instantly as a function of peak demand, LmaxðtÞ, 
jointly with a target reserve margin, RM*. This can be expressed by: 
K*I ðtÞ¼ LmaxðtÞ⋅ð1þRM
*Þ (25) 
Here, the target reserve margin is related to the initial reserve 
margin, obtained by computing the optimal technology mix at the 
beginning of simulations. Moreover, this value is fix over the whole 
simulation horizon, seeking to avoid the influence of external sources of 
dynamics. A price cap is also set in order to completely define the de-
mand curve for the capacity market. This work adopts a price cap, P*cap, 
equal to 600,000 €/MW∙year. By following the “missing money” 
approach, the bid price cap for the capacity market is, as well, adjusted 
according to the revenues coming from the energy market: 
PadjcapðtÞ ¼P
*
cap   πEMðtÞ (26) 
Finally, a capacity market clearing price at time t, πCMðtÞ
[€/MW∙year], can be attained as the price associated to the cumulated 
bid capacity, KbidcumðtÞ, that equals or immediately exceeds the target 








Fig. 4 depicts the exemplary clearing of a capacity market. It is worth 
to mention that, if the cumulated bid capacity were insufficient for 
surpassing the target capacity, the capacity market would be cleared at 
the price cap. Finally, the annual revenue that 1 MW from each tech-
nology will expect to make in the capacity market at any time, πCMi ðtÞ
[€/MW⋅year], can be approximated by: 
πCMi ðtÞ ¼E½πCMðtÞ� (28) 
When joining power systems including a capacity market, generators 
might then obtain a total annual rent equal to the addition of Eq. (17) 
and Eq. (28). This additional revenue should be used in Eq. (18) for 
approximating the total operating profit to be expected over the in-
vestment amortization period. In this model, the current state of demand 
and capacity will drive the observed profit to come from the capacity 
market. Furthermore, stochastic expectations upon future demand and 
capacity growth will define the expected value of future profits to be 
perceived from the same market. 
2.3.4. Performance metrics 
In order to assess the behavior of system adequacy over the simu-
lation period under the three remuneration schemes discussed in this 
paper, two metrics are adopted. Both metrics seek to denote the effec-
tiveness and the efficiency of each capacity mechanism, respectively. 
First, the Root Square Mean Error (RSME) [%] to the optimal reserve 











where S is the number of simulation steps from beginning to end of the 
simulation period; RMðnÞ is the reserve margin simulated for time step s, 
within the simulation horizon; and RM* denotes the optimal reserve 
margin. This variable is assumed as an effectiveness metric and can be 
understood as the mean deviation from the desired reserve margin over 
the period under analysis. 
Second, the Hourly Unitary Surplus (HUS) [€/MWh] is regarded as 
an efficiency metric and can be defined as follows: 
Fig. 4. Exemplary clearing of a capacity market. In black, the cumulated bids of 
new and existing capacity. 
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ðE½MPðtÞ�   PCðtÞÞ ⋅ dt (30) 
In Eq. (30), 0 and T represent the initial and the final simulation 
time, respectively. In addition, E½MPðtÞ� symbolizes the expected 
clearing price in the spot market; and PCðtÞ denotes the average system 
production cost, at time t within the simulation horizon. This parameter 
can be obtained from the enclosed area between simulations of expected 
market price and production cost. The HUS can be seen as the mean 
value of the hourly operating profits to be achieved by 1 MW of a generic 
generating unit over the simulation period. Operating profits are allo-
cated mainly to cover the fixed investments costs of power plants. By 
assuming identical capital costs for each case study, a higher HUS would 
mean that investors perceive higher profits when including capacity 
mechanisms due to the higher energy prices being paid by consumers. 
When high enough, these profits would exceed the amount required to 
cover the average investment cost of generating units, turning into a net 
surplus for investors, in detriment of the economic efficiency of the 
electricity market. 
3. Simulations and results 
3.1. Model pre-conditioning 
In order to assess the long-term system dynamics with the capacity 
remuneration mechanisms discussed in this work, simulations were 
carried out over a time horizon covering 20 years. These simulations 
involve the thermal generation system described in the previous section. 
The dde23 function of MATLAB was used to solve the delay differential 
equations (DDE) that describe the market dynamics. At t ¼ 0, the 
simplified system comprises an energy mix resting in long-run economic 
equilibrium. Parameters describing the attributes of each generating 
technology are presented in Table 1. Likewise, information on the in-
vestment responsiveness functions for each technology is included in 
Table 2. Input data regarding the stochastic processes that describe the 
uncertainty on the development of power demand, system capacity and 
fuel prices are shown in Table 3. Finally, analytical expressions used to 
estimate the progress of thermal efficiencies for the considered gener-
ating technologies are included in the Appendix. 
3.2. Base case results 
Fig. 5 illustrates the simulation of the total installed capacity and the 
expected peak demand, alongside with the system reserve margin under 
the theoretical framework of ROA for replicating investors’ decision- 
making. This simulation considers profits coming solely from the 
energy-only market, and thus coincide with results presented by Rios 
et al. (2019). Here, the market behavior accounts for the occurrence of 
construction cycles, which is explained in terms of the description of 
profitability expectations based on the dynamic interaction of observed 
market conditions (i.e. the EV) and the wait-and-see flexibility (i.e. the 
CV). It is worth to note that such underlying model has been validated in 
the scope of the SD modeling approach by following the formal pro-
cedure proposed by Barlas (1996). 
Now, the simulation of future dynamics of the reserve margin under 
capacity incentives is shown in Fig. 6. These economic incentives 
involve a price-based mechanism, i.e. a capacity payment, and a 
quantity-based mechanism, i.e. a capacity market, both of which have 
been explained in Section 2.3. As in the base case, the reserve margins in 
Fig. 6 are associated to a construction cycle. Occurrence of construction 
cycles, despite the addition of investment incentives, can be explained in 
sight of the expectation formation of investors. At the start of simula-
tions, uncertainty in load and capacity growth allows to anticipate some 
scenarios conditioned by deficit expectations higher than observed. 
Such situations are critical for incrementing the expected value of future 
capacity payments, and thus helps in increasing the CV of new power 
plants. Only when a high deficit probability is observed (around year 5), 
the addition of major profits during capacity shortfall situations and 
capacity payments trigger an EV capable of outweighing the value of 
postponement, and therefore new power plants enter the system. 
Table 1 
Input data on the generation technologies composing the test supply system.  
Technology HC CC GT 
Initial capacity (Ki) at t ¼ 0 [MW]  11905 2540 2020 
Construction delay (TCi )[month]  36 18 9 
Lifetime (Ti) [year]  40 30 20 
Investment costs (ICi) [€/kW]  1000 600 300 
Amortization period (TAi ) [year]  25 20 15 
Discount rate (ρ) [%/year]  12.5 12.5 12.5 
Time to the Option Maturity (dt) [year]  1.0 1.0 1.0 
Risk-free rate (ϕ) [%/year]  12.5 12.5 12.5 
Fixed costs [€/MWh] 14.92 9.33 5.06 
Fuel price (FPi) [€/MWh]  6.50 10.50 10.50 
Efficiency (age structure at t ¼ 0) [adim]  0.4063 0.4625 0.3072 
Usage duration (Di) (at t ¼ 0) [adim]  0.8345 0.3723 0.0052 
Unit availability (q) (at t ¼ 0) [adim]  0.9096 0.9096 0.9096  
Table 2 
Input data on the functions (Eq. (3)) describing the investment responsiveness 
for each technology.  
Technology HC CC GT 
Saturation (immaxi )  1.5 3.0 2.0 
Alpha (αiÞ 3.5 2.0 2.5 
Beta (βiÞ   2.8069   2.6932   2.5000  
Table 3 
Input data on the stochastic processes describing uncertainty on power demand, 
capacity and fuel prices at the Option Maturity.  
Parameter gL  gK  gcoalFP  g
gas
FP  
Long-term growth rate (g) [%/year]  1.00 1.00 0.02 0.02 
Speed of reversion (η) [%/year]  50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 
Volatility (σ) [%/year]  2.00 2.00 1.85 3.95 
Correlation factor [dmnl] 0.80 0.80 0.70 0.70  
Fig. 5. Simulation of capacity adequacy in an energy-only market based on the 
investment decision-making under irreversibility and uncertainty (Rios 
et al., 2019) 
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When dealing with a capacity market, the outcome is quite similar. 
Here, expectations upon market conditions after the beginning of sim-
ulations define scenarios with reserve margins higher than observed. 
These scenarios are associated to lower revenues that would come from 
the energy-only market, and thus higher bid prices in the capacity 
market. Moreover, it has been found that, for an increase of reserve 
margins in the short run (e.g. the Option Maturity), the bid prices in-
crease at a higher rate than the bid capacity with respect to the target 
capacity. Hence, despite expectations upon situations with higher 
reserve margins, the capacity market would be expected to be cleared at 
a similar level of cumulated bid capacity. At the Option Maturity, this 
determines realizations of capacity market clearing prices higher than 
observed, which ultimately aids to upturn the expected value of po-
tential profits derived from such market. Consequently, the CV of new 
investments is incremented, and new projects are postponed until the 
reserve margin reaches a significant low value around year 4. Only then, 
the shortfall of installed capacity with respect to its target allows 
observing higher profits from the capacity market. These profits, added 
to the higher profits related to capacity shortfalls coming from the 
energy-only market, sets the EV higher than the CV, thus enabling 
construction of new power plants. 
Despite the occurrence of construction cycles, Fig. 6 shows that 
reserve margins would depict a reduced amplitude due to the integra-
tion of capacity mechanisms. It is worth to note the steadier oscillation 
being depicted by the reserve margin with a capacity market. Such 
behavior can be explained because investors have to balance expecta-
tions upon profits coming from the energy market (related to lower 
reserve margins and the deferral option) against profits coming from the 
capacity market (related to higher reserve margins and the exercise of 
new investments). Notwithstanding, this oscillation tends to occur 
around values (7%–8%) lower than the target reserve margin (9.75%). 
Ultimately, this outcome depends upon the interaction of the variables 
and parameters that determine each source of profit. On one hand, the 
energy rents are mainly deficit profits, which are defined by the VOLL. 
On the other hand, the capacity market revenues are contingent upon 
the bid factor of new capacity and the price cap. 
In accordance the reduced amplitude of reserve margins, as seen in 
Fig. 7, expectations upon capacity shortfall events would be dampened 
when including incentives, thus supporting the security of supply. In 
those cases, such system behavior can be attributed to the upturn of the 
EV of power plants thanks to the addition of a new source of profit for 
investors. Unlike the situation with the energy-only market, the 
evolution of the PI with capacity mechanisms is thus associated to the 
First and Second Strategies within the Exercise-Continuation Value 
plane (Invest Now and Probably Later in Fig. 2, respectively). This is 
critical for the baseload technology, which accounts for the higher 
capital costs, and thus is assumed to adopt the most-risk-averse profile 
when deciding new power plants. In that context, Fig. 8 displays the 
evolution of capacity under construction for the baseload technology 
under the three discussed market designs. By looking at Fig. 8, it can be 
seen that the capacity under construction depicts a more stable response 
around the expected behavior under long-term economic equilibrium 
when including capacity mechanisms. 
The more stable development with capacity mechanisms would be 
obtained at expense of higher prices for consumers. Fig. 9 includes the 
simulation of total energy prices with the integration of capacity in-
centives. Regarding results from Fig. 7, the energy-only market in those 
cases would account for lower prices due to the reduced durations of 
deficit. However, the prevailing capacity incentives would increase the 
total energy price to be paid by users, and thus the benefit to be 
Fig. 6. Simulation of reserve margin in an energy-only (EO) market; EO plus 
capacity payments (EO þ CP); and EO plus capacity market (EO þ CM). 
Fig. 7. Simulation of expected deficit duration in an energy-only (EO) market; 
EO plus capacity payments (EO þ CP),; and EO plus capacity market (EO 
þ CM). 
Fig. 8. Simulation of capacity under construction (Kuc) for the base technology 
(HC) in an energy-only (EO) market; EO plus capacity payments (EO þ CP); and 
EO plus capacity market (EO þ CM). 
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perceived by investors. When dealing with capacity payments, the price 
would account for major spikes, coincident to the reductions of reserve 
margin. This is reasonable, since the capacity payment is assumed pro-
portional to the expected deficit duration and the VOLL. The total price 
in the context of the capacity market would denote a slighter fluctuation. 
However, its average value over the simulation period would be 
increased due to the addition of the capacity market price. 
By looking at Fig. 9, it can be seen how the total price in the context 
of the capacity market decreases rapidly after the beginning of simula-
tions. This occurs despite the increase of the spot market, due to the 
reduction of the system reserve margin (Fig. 6). This is explained in sight 
of a more dramatic decrease of the capacity market clearing price with 
respect to the spot market price. It is worth to recall that, based on the 
“missing money”, bid prices in the capacity market denote the difference 
between avoidable costs and expected revenues from the energy market. 
Hence, bid prices, and consequently, the capacity market clearing price, 
plummet as a result of the increase of the spot market price. Only after 
the reserve margin decreases low enough around year 4, the cumulated 
bids of existing and new capacity are insufficient to cover the target 
capacity, and therefore the capacity market is cleared at the price cap. 
This price cap prevails until sufficient capacity is constructed, after 
which the construction cycle would be triggered once again. 
Rigorously, a trade-off can be identified in terms of the mean devi-
ation from the target reserve margin (effectiveness and security of 
supply) against the hourly-average unitary surplus for investors (effi-
ciency and cost for consumers). Table 4 summarizes the performance 
metrics delivered by the three market designs under study. By consid-
ering the test generation system, the integration of a capacity market 
provides the best performance regarding the security of supply, at 
expense of the highest cost for consumers. On the opposite, the energy- 
only market allows the lowest cost, in detriment of the worst security of 
supply. The trade-off can also be explained in terms of the higher 
perception of profitability, associated to higher power prices, needed to 
counteract the investor’s willingness to postpone new power plants and 
promote a steadier capacity adequacy. 
3.3. Impact of uncertainty on the performance of system adequacy 
A sensitivity analysis was carried out with respect to the growth rate 
volatility of load and capacity. According to the scope of our study, these 
are considered to be the key parameters driving the uncertainty that 
affects the decision-making of new generating capacity. Because of that, 
such results are the most significant for assessing the model long-term 
response. 
Simulation results for a lower and a higher volatility of load growth 
and capacity construction related to the base case are included in Fig. 10 
and Fig. 11, respectively. As exposed by Rios et al. (2019), the long-term 
dynamics of electricity markets would be extremely sensitive to this 
parameter when investors account for the postponement option of new 
power plants under irreversibility and uncertainty. From the initial 
equilibrium state, the capacity adequacy would face a higher decline of 
reserve margins when investors expect a higher volatility. At the same 
time, significant price spikes would be affecting the energy-only market. 
Despite the system behavior would eventually stabilize, it would derive 
in a reduced level of reserve margin with respect to the initial (optimal) 
value, thus increasing the prevailing level of prices in the marketplace. 
This behavior is explained in terms of the expectation formation of in-
vestors, since the more volatile expectations upon load and capacity at 
option maturity result in realizations with higher scarcity rents with 
respect to the base case. This allow the CV to escalate, therefore limiting 
the addition of new generating units even more. Ultimately, investors 
require experiencing higher profits, i.e. a higher EV, associated to more 
severe capacity shortage situations, in order to decide construction of 
new power plants. 
Results from Figs. 10 and 11 show how the addition of capacity in-
centives, especially the capacity market, would allow the market to 
obtain a smaller reduction of reserve margins after the start of simula-
tions, and an overall more stable long-term behavior with respect to the 
energy-only market. This aspect should be critical for markets facing 
highly uncertain growth rates, e.g. in developing countries with fast- 
growing emerging economies. In that sense, the integration of capac-
ity mechanisms might contribute to mitigate or avoid the occurrence of 
construction cycles, thus increasing the security of supply. However, 
when implementing such mechanisms, it would be worth to remind the 
trade-off involving the increase of supply security and the increase of 
Fig. 9. Simulation of average production cost (PC) and market price (MP) in an 
energy-only (EO) market; EO plus capacity payments (EO þ CP); and EO plus 
capacity market (EO þ CM). 
Table 4 
Performance metrics of simulated capacity adequacy in an energy-only (EO) 
market, EO plus capacity payments (EO þ CP) and EO plus capacity market (EO 
þ CM).  
Performance metric EO EO þ CP EO þ CM 
RSME to Target reserve margin [%] 2.61 2.37 1.79 
HUS for investors [€/MWh] 19.24 30.29 38.32  
Fig. 10. Reserve margin in an energy-only (EO) market; EO plus capacity 
payments (EO þ CP); and EO plus capacity market (EO þ CM); with the growth 
rate volatility of demand and capacity equal to 1.5%/year. 
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total energy price to be paid by consumers. 
4. Conclusions and policy implications 
This article has introduced a modeling framework intending to assist 
in the evaluation of remuneration incentives to power capacity by 
realistically describing the microeconomics of the decision-making 
process followed by generators under irreversibility and uncertainty. 
This work has built upon a recent-developed simulation model that as-
sesses the long-term dynamics of the energy-only market based on an 
investment signal computed by means of ROA, thus contingent upon the 
EV and the CV of new power plants. In that context, the main contri-
bution of this work has been to address the long-run power system 
performance with the introduction of two capacity remuneration 
mechanisms. The examined incentives involve both, a price-based 
mechanism, i.e. a capacity payment, and a quantity-based remunera-
tion mechanism, i.e. a capacity market. The question about the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of these capacity mechanisms has been at the 
center of the debate in recent years. In fact, this issue is under permanent 
scrutiny in electricity markets worldwide since there are yet limited 
theoretical and empirical answers regarding their economic implica-
tions and overall impact on the long-term security of supply. 
Simulations were carried out on a test generation system by 
considering three market designs: an energy-only market, an energy 
market plus capacity payments, and an energy-market plus a capacity 
market. Results have suggested that the integration of capacity in-
centives, especially the capacity market, would allow the system to 
develop a steadier behavior in the long term, thus limiting the occur-
rence of construction cycles. In general, this finding is coincident with 
conclusions of very recent research papers addressing the same topic 
(Petitet et al., 2017; Abani et al., 2018; �Alvarez-Uribe et al., 2018; 
Heidarizadeh and Ahmadian, 2019). This work has deepened the anal-
ysis by explicitly modeling the decision-making of investors under 
irreversibility and uncertainty. In addition, the extent to which capacity 
mechanisms are effective and efficient in the long-term have been 
addressed by formally introducing two performance metrics. These 
metrics have permitted to identify a trade-off between effectiveness and 
efficiency, which means that the incorporation of incentives would 
certainly allow to achieve a steadier system development, but, at 
expense of higher energy costs for consumers. 
Governmental authorities and regulators might benefit from the 
proposed structural power market model and performance metrics in 
order to gain insight on the designing of efficient electricity markets that 
deliver supply reliability. According to the scope of this article, the ca-
pacity market has looked preferable for promoting capacity adequacy in 
response to demand growth. A sensitivity analysis has suggested that the 
capacity market would also contribute in increasing supply security 
when higher uncertainties affect growth of key market variables, i.e. 
electricity demand and power capacity, as it is indeed the case in fast- 
growing emerging economies. This is consistent with the worldwide 
inclination to introduce quantity-based capacity mechanisms for remu-
nerating generation capacity. The proposed modeling framework offers 
a tool to address policy and economic implications of different mecha-
nism designs, that is, the higher energy prices associated to achieving a 
steadier system long-run evolution. It is worth to recall that such higher 
prices increase the value of immediate exercising construction of new 
generation projects, thus counteracting the generators’ preference to 
postpone irreversible investments under uncertainty. 
4.1. Critical review of the proposed model and further research 
This work is limited to the consideration of only two capacity in-
centives. It is worth to recognize the existence of further mechanisms, 
some of which are listed in Section 1. Design and application of such 
mechanisms varies according to the specific power market itself. Here, 
simulations of the capacity market have adopted a constant bidding 
factor of new capacity (a) over the entire horizon. It is worth to note that 
a sensitivity analysis on a would offer a more refined insight about its 
impact on the system response. Moreover, the dynamic adjustment of a 
might provide an additional tool to control the system behavior over the 
long-term. However, the constant value of a is assumed to be sufficient 
as a first approach to analyze the long-term system dynamics. With that 
in mind, the two incentives discussed in this article, jointly with their 
parameters, mainly intend to demonstrate the applicability of the pro-
posed approach. The underlying model is flexible enough to allow the 
integration of alternative, tailor-made mechanisms. 
The impact of renewable generation technologies and demand 
responsiveness is also beyond the scope of this work. It is important to 
mention the current role of large-scale addition of renewables in power 
markets worldwide. Moreover, the integration of smart-grid technolo-
gies, e.g. energy storage, tough incipient, is allowing the demand to be 
much more responsive against price fluctuations. The literature includes 
the application of System Dynamics approach to describe the market 
dynamics with renewables (Hasani-Marzooni and Hosseini, 2011b). In 
order to define investor’s long-term expectations upon profitability, the 
challenge consists in adapting the long-term equivalents of load and 
supply to account for the chronological pattern of renewable power 
output. In this work, renewable integration will indeed introduce a new 
source of short-term and long-term uncertainty, which in turn will be 
critical for the investment decision-making model based on Real Op-
tions. On one hand, short-term stochastic power fluctuations of renew-
able generation would increase the need for incremental and 
decremental operating reserve capacity in conventional generating 
units. As energy and reserve markets are coupled, increasing demand for 
reserve will affect reserve and energy prices as well. On the other hand, 
future penetration rates of renewable capacity to existing supply systems 
reduce the net demand to be supplied to the conventional technologies, 
particularly base-load capacity. This entails a significant source of un-
certainty when deciding expansion in conventional thermal technolo-
gies. A stochastic logistic diffusion model (Verhulst-Pearl process) has 
been proposed for describing uncertainty dynamics of renewable 
penetration rates in the context of Real Option valuation (Blanco and 
Olsina, 2011). These phenomena are amenable to be incorporated in the 
proposed long-term market simulation model. 
However, this work first seeks to evaluate the market evolution with 
capacity mechanisms according to the prevailing technology mix, i.e. 
thermal technologies. Furthermore, it is assumed that such mix will 
prevail in the majority of power markets, even in the long run (Covert 
Fig. 11. Reserve margin in an energy-only (EO) market; EO plus capacity 
payments (EO þ CP); and EO plus capacity market (EO þ CM); with the growth 
rate volatility of demand and capacity equal to 3%/year. 
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et al., 2016). Because of that, renewable integration and demand 
responsiveness involve an important research problem to be undertaken 
in further projects. 
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Appendix 
Polynomial estimation of thermal efficiencies (t > t0 and t0 ¼ 2000) (t in months) 
HC: ⋅ þ 1:5684e   24t4   6:2935e   22t3 þ 6:2014e   20t2 þ 1:6667e   04t þ 0:455  
CC: ⋅   3:2150e   11t4 þ 1:9290e   08t3   4:0509e   06t2 þ 5:1389e   04t þ 0:600  
GT: ⋅   3:2150e   11t4 þ 1:9290e   08t3   4:7454e   06t2 þ 7:2222e   04t þ 0:350  
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